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period to the present day. The analysis is framed in terms of two geographic scales: regions and
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explain the location of economic activities at one scale many not apply to other scales. We consider
the process of settling the "frontier"; the development of national markets in goods and factors and,
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  Economic geography is central to economic development. As economies develop, the 
original allocation of resources across locations rarely remains fixed. New industries develop 
and, for technological or other reasons, find it profitable to situate in different locations than old 
industries. Transportation networks emerge, linking far-flung markets, within and across 
countries, again potentially altering the spatial distribution of resources. Equally as or even more 
importantly, the density of economic activity changes with development. In low income 
societies, much economic activity is concentrated in low-density activities, such as agriculture or 
cottage industries. As per capita income rises, capital and labor migrate to cities, and average 
density rises. But within cities, density may also change over time, as people and firms find it to 
their advantage to spread out over a wider “metropolitan” area. 
  We explore the economic geography of the U.S. from a historical perspective in two 
geographic scales: regions and urban areas. The most compelling reason for studying geographic 
areas of differing scales is that models which explain the location of economic activities at one 
scale, such as the region, may not apply to smaller scales such as urban areas, or even finer ones 
like financial and industrial districts.
1 Further, the examination of these two geographic units of 
observation, regions and urban areas, presents a more coherent understanding of the historical 
geography of the U.S., than treating each geographic dimension separately.  
  We have three major goals: to systematically present historical data on U.S. regions and 
urban areas, to survey the existing literature on the historical geography of the U.S., and to direct 
                                                           
 
1  Fujita and Thisse (2002) note that geographers have long known that geographic scale matters. 
According to Fujita and Thisse, to ascribe what is true at one spatial scale to another is to commit 
ecological fallacy.    3
scholars to promising avenues of research. Because this subject is a vast one that touches on 
many disciplines, our review of the literature is necessarily selective and highly incomplete. 
However, even an incomplete review, we believe, can offer important insights on the 
fundamental role of geography in American economic development. It is impossible, in our 
opinion, to understand long-term development of the U.S. divorced from its geography. 
Surprisingly, however, many important areas remain relatively unexplored and we try to 
highlight the most significant of these in our review. 
II. U.S. Regional Development. 
  One of the most distinctive characteristics of America is space.
2 In 1800, the United 
States was already one of the largest nations in the world. In the nineteenth century, the U.S. 
became a continental nation of enormous proportions from sea to sea. Moreover, the Americans 
faced unprecedented challenges in integrating vast unpopulated territories politically and 
economically. The Northwest Ordinance provided an orderly procedure for incorporating 
unsettled territories into states, but sectional differences over slavery led to divergence and 
disunion. However, by the early twentieth century, the states of the union emerged as a unified 
nation. This section addresses three of the most significant developments in U.S. economic 
geography from a regional perspective: the westward migration of Americans, the rise of a 
national economy, and the divergence and convergence of U.S. regional economies. 
  Settlement of the U.S. Continent 
  In the colonial period, most Americans of European and African descent lived along the 
                                                           
 
2  “North and South, east and west, city and country, from the 1790s to the 1850s, the most 
powerful influence in shaping of American society was space. The ideas about space, the uses of space, 
the projects across space, and the accommodations to space, above all else, charted the basic changes that 
occurred between these years.” Robert H. Wiebe as quoted in Meinig (1993; p.219).  4
eastern seaboard. With the Treaty of Versailles in 1783, Americans gained independence and 
vast stretches of land through the mid-western U.S. Between 1783 and 1898, through purchase, 
conquest, or treaty, Americans acquired a continental area of 3 million square miles. Moreover, 
Americans migrated westward in waves. During the first half of the nineteenth century, people 
from the Northeast migrated to the East North Central region, and those from the Southeast 
migrated to the East South Central region. In the second half of the nineteenth century, migration 
continued westward to the West North Central and, to a lesser extent, the West South Central 
region. Finally, in the twentieth century, population migrated further west and south to the 
Mountain, Pacific and West South Central regions (See Figure 1). 
  Most migrants moved west along the latitude. Meinig (1993) documents the geographic 
patterns of westward migration and the establishment of western settlements in the nineteenth 
century. Since most people involved in the westward migration were farmers, people may have 
migrated along the latitude because they acquired latitude-specific skills in agriculture (see 
Steckel (1983)). However, the westward migration is not without puzzles. Normally, economists 
argue that individuals migrate from low to high per capita income areas, all other things equal. In 
the case of the South, this appears to be consistent with the gradient of per capita incomes 
(higher in the west than in the east). But in the North, the gradient ran in the opposite direction - 
incomes were higher in the east than in the west.  
  Why did people go west? The most famous explanation is the safety valve hypothesis 
proposed by the historian Frederick Jackson Turner; the economically dispossessed easterners 
migrated to the west where land was cheap. However, most economic historians dismiss the 
safety valve hypothesis on the grounds that migration to the west was costly, both in terms of  5
opportunity costs and resources. In particular, farm-making on the western frontier was very 
costly, well beyond the means of unemployed industrial workers in eastern cities. Nevertheless, 
using sophisticated econometric methods, Ferrie (1997) finds some evidence that migration was 
indeed selective in the sense required by the safety valve hypothesis. In addition, the safety valve 
hypothesis is consistent with Fogel and Rutner’s (1972) analysis that the sale of large tracts of 
western lands by the federal government induced the westward movement. 
  The safety valve hypothesis is consistent with the east-west gradient of per capita income 
distribution in the North, but many scholars believe that income per capita does not always 
accurately measure gains to migration. It is well known that fertility was high on the western 
frontier. Adjusting for the higher dependency ratio (children to economically active adults) 
narrows the difference in per capita incomes between the Midwest and the Northeast (Fogel 
1989). More recently, Margo (1999, 2000) has provided real wage indices that are corrected for 
regional differences in cost of living. Margo (1999, 2000) finds considerable evidence for the 
hypothesis, initially proposed by Coeholo and Shepherd (1976), that westward migration was 
prompted by higher marginal product of labor on the frontier than in the east. According to 
Margo’s estimates, real wages of unskilled labor were about 30% higher in the Midwest than in 
the Northeast ca. 1830. However, as east-west migration began in earnest, the real wage gap in 
the North diminished to about 15% or so on the eve of the Civil War. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, a gap remained, but it was smaller (about 10%) than the gap that existed just 
prior to the War. Margo also shows that the real wage gap for skilled labor was initially much 
higher, but also converged before the Civil War.  
  Finally, migration to the antebellum frontier may not be explained by current income, but  6
by future returns - that is, by capital gains. There is evidence that “getting there first” had 
economic value on the frontier. Early migrants got the best land and, if and when the railroad 
came through, got the most capital gains (Galenson and Pope 1992; Craig, Palmquist, and Weiss 
1998; Coffman and Gregson 1998). 
  Economic Integration and the Rise of a National Economy 
  In the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, the colonial economies were integrated 
with Europe and the West Indies. Beginning in the early nineteenth century, greater investments 
in internal transportation began to integrate the domestic economy intra-regionally and inter-
regionally. Initially, private construction of turnpike roads increased the mileage of roads in New 
England and Middle Atlantic regions from 4,684 to 11,662 miles between 1810 and 1830.
3 
However, most of these investments were not profitable. In the following decades, the 
construction of canals and the use of steamboats on navigable waters lowered the costs of trade 
markedly. However, the integration of U.S. regional economies really began in earnest with the 
emergence of the railroads in the 1850s. The growth in the mileage of railroads and telegraphs 
between the late nineteenth and the turn of the twentieth centuries was spectacular. For example, 
between 1860 and 1890, the mileage of operation in railroads increased sharply from 30,626 to 
166,703 miles whereas that of telegraphs increased from 50,000 to 19,382,000 miles.
4 These 
advances in transportation led to dramatic declines in domestic freight rates (see North (1973 )).  
  Regional convergence in prices suggests that integration occurred at different rates for 
goods and factor markets. Goods market integration seems to have been realized by the latter 
                                                           
 
3  See Fishlow (2000) for a summary of developments in internal transportation during the 
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.  
 
4  Despite the growing importance of the railroads, Fogel (1964) argues that the direct benefits 
from lower transportation costs due to the railroads were about two percent of GNP in 1890.  7
half of the nineteenth century, capital markets by the early twentieth century, and labor markets 
by the mid-twentieth century. North (1961) and Harley (1980) find rapid convergence in the 
prices of goods such as lard, pork, flour, and wheat across regions between 1820 and 1860 
(North 1961; Harley 1980). Davis (1965) finds marked convergence in interest rates by the early 
1900s.
5 Finally, while there is convergence of wages and earnings by the mid-twentieth century, 
labor markets seem to have remained segmented for a longer period between the North and the 
South (Rosenbloom 1990; Margo and Villaflor 1987; Goldin and Margo 1992; Margo 2003). 
  Over the past two centuries or so, the United States has become, in effect, a national 
market in goods and factors of production. Incomes are now less tied to place than they are to 
skills, and regions are more homogenous with respect to economic activity than they once were. 
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that region no longer “matters” in the United 
States. Regions are still subject to economic shocks, and the evidence is that such shocks have 
consequences for incomes and employment, at least for the medium run, if not for the very long 
run (Blanchard and Katz 1992). 
  Divergence and Convergence of U.S. Regional Economies 
  The most significant long-run trend in U.S. regional economies is the divergence and 
convergence of U.S. regional economies. In the colonial period, regional differences in industrial 
structures and incomes were relatively slight. The U.S. regional economies diverged between the 
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. The divergence was first seen in industrial structures 
as the Northeast region industrialized during the first half of the nineteenth century. In the late 
                                                           
 
5  However, Bodenhorn and Rockoff (1992) suggest that the integration of capital markets 
occurred much earlier. They find that regional interest rates were well integrated in the antebellum period, 
but that the disruptions of the Civil War caused the dis-integration of capital markets in the postbellum 
period, especially in the South and the Pacific Coast regions.   8
nineteenth century, industrial divergence deepened with the formation of the manufacturing belt 
in the North and the continued specialization of agriculture in the South. The divergence in 
income per capita, especially between the North and the South, emerged strongly in the post-
bellum period. Southern income per capita fell relatively and absolutely. However, in the second 
half of the twentieth century, regional industrial structures as well as regional income per capita 
converged dramatically.  
  A. Trends in U.S. Regional Economic Structures 
  The colonial economy was dominated by agriculture, extractive industries and fisheries 
and was motivated by trade with Europe and the West Indies. Data on exports constructed by 
Shepherd and Walton (1972) suggest that the American colonies were highly specialized in their 
export staples.
6 The New England colonies were specialized in fish, meat, wood products, 
whales, potash and grain; the Middle Colonies in grain, and to a smaller extent in flaxseed, 
wood, iron, meat and potash; the Upper South colonies in tobacco, and to a lesser extent in grain, 
iron and wood products; the Lower South colonies primarily in rice and indigo as well as 
deerskin, naval store, wood, grain and meat products. Most scholars believe that these patterns of 
colonial regional economic specialization can be explained by regional comparative advantage 
based on soil, climate and geography. 
  The early industrialization of the U.S. economy led to the first divergence of U.S. 
regional economies. Prior to industrialization, domestic manufactured goods were produced by 
artisans in urban areas. As the U.S. economy industrialized in the first half of the nineteenth 
                                                           
 
6  The New England colonies consist of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode 
Island; the Middle colonies consist of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware; the Upper 
South colonies consist of Maryland and Virginia; and Lower South consists of North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.  9
century, manufacturing moved out of artisan shops into non-mechanized and mechanized 
factories. Sokoloff (1984, 1986) documents that the rise of factory production in a variety of 
industries such as boots and shoes, coaches and wagons, furniture, hats, paper, leather tanning, 
and textiles was associated with significant increases in labor and total factor productivity. The 
early industrialization led to regional divergence as manufacturing became increasingly 
concentrated in the Northeast region. In 1840, the share of the labor force in New England and 
Middle Atlantic regions in non-agricultural activities was 38% and 32% respectively, whereas, 
for the remaining regions, the figure ranged from 10% to 18%. 
  Why did industrialization begin in New England? Historians like Hunter (1979) have 
emphasized the abundance of waterpower sites in New England. However, it is also well known 
that women and children played an important role in the early industrialization of the U.S. 
Goldin and Sokoloff (1982) propose that early industrialization proceeded in New England 
because of the opportunity costs of women and children relative to men in farming were lower in 
that region than in others. Goldin and Sokoloff find that the relative wages of women and 
children compared to men were lower in New England than in other regions. Moreover, the 
relative wage of females rose sharply with industrialization.  
  Sokoloff (1984) documents that the extension of markets due to the construction of 
canals led to the re-organization of production from one based on artisanal shops to non-
mechanized and mechanized factories in the Northeast. Sokoloff suggests that initial advantages 
of factory production came from firm reorganization. The greater division of labor caused by the 
extension of markets in non-mechanized factories led to significant increases in productivity. 
However, increased inventive activity caused by extension of markets, also documented by  10
Sokoloff (1988), may have contributed to the second phase where increases in productivity are 
associated with mechanized factories that adopted new methods of production, power sources, 
and new machinery. Lindstrom (1978) proposes a slightly different hypothesis for the 
concentration of manufacturing in the Northeast based on demand. Lindstrom argues that the 
increase in intra-regional demand brought on by falling transportation costs in the Northeast led 
to the concentration of manufacturing in that region. Overtime, however, supply-side factors may 
have become more important.
7 
  The rise of a mature industrial economy in the U.S. between the late nineteenth and the 
early twentieth century was accompanied by a significant divergence in U.S. regional economies, 
especially between the North and South. Manufacturing spread from the Northeast to the East 
North Central region to form the manufacturing belt whereas the South remained entrenched in 
agriculture. In the second half of the twentieth century, as manufacturing spread South and West, 
U.S. regional economies converged significantly.  
  The divergence and convergence of U.S. regional economies are documented by Kim 
(1995, 1998). Kim finds that the patterns of U.S. regional specialization differed considerably by 
sector (see Figure 2). In agriculture, regions continued to become more specialized over time in 
various crops such as wheat, barley, corn, oats, rye, cotton, tobacco and vegetables. In 
manufacturing, data at the two-digit industry level indicate that regions became more specialized 
between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries; however, since the mid-twentieth 
century, regions became substantially more similar in industrial structure.
8 Regional 
                                                           
 
7  See Rosenberg (1963). 
 
8  The two-digit industries in manufacturing are food, tobacco, apparel, lumber and wood, 
furniture and fixtures, paper, printing and publishing, chemicals, petroleum and coal, rubber and plastics, 
leather, stone, clay and glass, primary metal, fabricated metal, machinery, electrical machinery,  11
specialization in the service industries, wholesale trade, retail trade, and other services were low 
for the second half of the twentieth century when data were available.
9 
  Kim (1998) finds that regions became more specialized at the 1-digit sectoral level 
between 1870 and 1880, fell slightly between 1880 and 1910, and then fell significantly over the 
twentieth century.
10 However, the data indicate that differences in regional industrial structures 
between the North and South were particularly high until the second half of the twentieth 
century. Between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, regional industrial 
structures between the North and South differed by more than 50% from that of the overall 
average. This difference was caused by the concentration of manufacturing in the North and the 
concentration of agriculture in the South. In the twentieth century, regional industrial structures 
converged significantly. The convergence was caused by the dispersal of agriculture and the shift 
in economic structure into services.  
  For most regional and urban economists, the emergence of the manufacturing belt during 
the second half of the nineteenth century marked a major turning point in the U.S. economic 
geography.
11 The manufacturing belt, composed mostly of the New England, Middle Atlantic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
transportation, instruments, and miscellaneous. 
 
9  The wholesale industries match the two-digit industries in manufacturing; the retail industries 
consist of food and general stores, general merchandise, apparel, furniture, automotive, filling stations, 
eating, drug stores, and other; services industries consist of hotel and lodging, personal, business, auto 
repair, garages, miscellaneous repair, motion pictures, amusement and recreational, health, legal, 
educational, social, museum and botanical zoological gardens, membership organizations, and 
miscellaneous. 
 
10  For 1870 and 1950, the one-digit industries consist of agriculture, mining, forestry, fishing, 
manufacturing and services. For the years between 1939 and 1987, construction, transportation, wholesale 
trade, retail trade, and government industries were also included. 
 
11  See Holmes and Stevens (2004) for an informative map of the manufacturing belt and the 
location of large manufacturing plants in 1947 and 1999.  12
and East North Central regions, contained the majority of manufacturing employment between 
the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. Krugman (1991) proposes that the 
U.S. manufacturing belt emerged when economies of scale in production rose and transportation 
costs fell. To minimize transportation costs, firms chose to locate in one region - the 
manufacturing belt. The concentration of firms further increased local demand and locked in the 
initial advantage. Krugman suggests that the manufacturing belt also benefited from a denser 
population and a transportation network that provided a substantially larger local market. 
  Meyer (1983, 1989) presents a slightly different interpretation of the rise of the 
manufacturing belt. For Meyer, the manufacturing belt arose as series of regional industrial 
systems in the antebellum period that merged to form the manufacturing belt in the late 
nineteenth century. Meyer, in an analysis similar to that of Lindstrom (1978) for early 
industrialization, argues that local regional demand triggered industrialization in a series of 
regions stretching from the East to the Midwest over time. Although regions like the Midwest 
industrialized later than those in the Northeast, Meyer argues that high interregional 
transportation costs enabled Midwestern manufacturers to develop their own manufacturing 
sector during the antebellum period. When transportation costs fell in the late nineteenth century, 
Midwestern manufacturers were able to effectively compete with Eastern producers.   
  Kim (1999) presents alternative evidence for the rise of the manufacturing belt based on 
natural advantages. Since data on interregional trade are not available to test the Heckscher-
Ohlin model, Kim exploits the Rybczynski theorem that provides a linear relationship between 
factor endowments and production. Kim finds that a relatively small number of factor 
endowments is able to explain significant variations in U.S. state production for twenty 2-digit  13
manufacturing industries for 1880 and 1900 as well as later periods in the twentieth century. 
While these results do not rule out the importance of increasing returns, they suggest that natural 
advantages may have played a significant role in the rise of the manufacturing belt. 
  The emergence and persistence of the manufacturing belt was a significant phenomenon 
in U.S. economic history. It justly deserves greater attention by scholars. However, the declining 
importance of the manufacturing belt and the rapid convergence of regional industrial structures 
during the second half of the twentieth century should receive equal attention. Kim (1995) argues 
that the rise and decline of regional specialization, or the divergence and convergence of regional 
industrial structures, can be accounted for by changes in the factor mobility of factors and goods. 
As transportation costs of final goods relative to inputs fell between the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, regions became more specialized in order to exploit their comparative 
advantage. During the second half of the twentieth century, as factors became increasingly more 
mobile relative to goods, and as new technologies such as electricity reduced the importance of 
regional differences in resources, regional industrial structures converged. 
  An alternative interpretation of the convergence of U.S. regional industrial structures is 
the core-periphery reversal (Krugman and Venebles (1995), Puga (1999), Tabuchi (1998), 
Helpman (1998)) or the bell-shape relationship discussed in Ottaviano and Thisse (2004). 
Assuming labor mobility throughout, as transportation costs fall low enough with any type of 
congestion in the core (or with limited mobility throughout), the core-periphery structure will 
reverse with industrial diffusion. However, at this point, we do not know of any empirical studies 
based on this theory.  
  B. Trends in U.S. Regional Incomes  14
  In the colonial period, differences in regional income per capita seem to have been slight. 
While we do not have estimates of regional income per capita, we have estimates of regional 
wealth per capita. Using probate records, Jones (1980) finds that differences in wealth per capita 
were very small. In 1774, wealth estimates in pounds sterling for New England, Middle 
Colonies, and the Southern colonies were £36.4, £40.2 and £35.4 respectively. However, the 
wealth per capita for the free population was significantly higher for the Southern colonies. 
  In the early nineteenth century, regional incomes diverged somewhat. Yet the divergence 
was not along North and South. Although income per capita in the Northeast was higher than the 
national average, it was highest in the West South Central region in 1840 and 1860 (see Table 1 
and Fogel (1989)). In the second half of the nineteenth century, Figure 3 shows that regional 
incomes diverged significantly, especially between the North and the South. Income per capita in 
the South fell sharply during the Civil War decade, absolutely and relative to other regions. 
Although there was some recovery after the initial decline, the pace was slow. By 1900, the 
income per capita of the South was barely half of the national average. However, during the 
second half of the twentieth century, regional incomes converged substantially (Easterlin (1960, 
1961), Mitchener and McLean (1999)). Although there are still regional differences, these are 
much smaller than before World War II, particularly in the case of the South.  
  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) find that the convergence of U.S. regional income per 
capita in the twentieth century is consistent with the predictions of the neoclassical growth 
model. As predicted by the model, growth in income per capita was inversely correlated with 
initial incomes in 1880. However, there is no work in the growth literature that examines the 
divergence of U.S. regional income per capita in the late nineteenth century. While this  15
divergence may be consistent with models of growth based on increasing returns, scholars have 
not examined regional income per capita between 1860 and 1900 using this framework. 
  The divergence and convergence of regional industrial structures can potentially cause 
divergence and convergence of regional income per capita. To the extent that wages differ across 
industries, regional specialization in different industries may cause aggregate incomes to differ. 
Using a simple decomposition procedure, Kim (1998) finds that, while the level of importance 
varies with regions and time, the divergence and convergence of regional industrial structures are 
highly correlated with that of regional income per capita. Caselli and Coleman (2001) report 
similar findings with a more sophisticated decomposition procedure. In addition, these studies 
also show that differences in regional wages in identical industries also contributed to the 
divergence and convergence of regional incomes. However, this latter component is better 
explained by models of economic growth rather than economic geography. 
  For Krugman, the divergence and convergence of regional incomes are accounted for by 
transportation costs and increasing returns. When transportation costs fell, increasing returns in 
manufacturing led to the rise of the manufacturing belt where high-wage jobs were concentrated. 
However, Krugman and Venebles (1995) show that when transportation costs fall even further, 
then regions eventually converge even when increasing returns are present. On the other hand, 
Kim (1998) and Caselli and Coleman (2001) present explanations for the divergence and 
convergence of regional incomes based on comparative advantage.
12 Caselli and Coleman 
suggest that the shift out of agriculture in the South was aided by the declining costs of acquiring 
                                                           
 
12  Kim’s (1998) argument is outlined above. Caselli and Coleman’s (2001) present an interesting 
model based on the following assumptions: less than unit income elasticity of farm good demand, faster 
factor productivity growth in agriculture, and declining costs of acquiring non-farming skills.   16
nonagricultural skills.
13  
  However, most economic historians argue that the institution of slavery had a major 
impact on U.S. regional development over time. Slavery and its dissolution greatly influenced 
the productivity of agriculture in the South before and after the Civil War and, consequently on 
U.S. regional per capita incomes. The legacy of slavery and the Civil War led to an isolated labor 
market in the South and it contributed to poor educational infrastructure. Economic historians 
interpret the Civil War as a major negative shock that took many years to work through. Many 
economic historians also believe that the federal government played an important role in the 
integration of the South into the national economy. 
  The causes of the decline in per capita incomes in the South have been extensively 
studied by economic historians. There is general agreement that the economic dislocation caused 
by the Civil War was responsible for at least some of the initial decline. Fogel and Engerman 
(1974, 1979) argue that slave labor was relatively efficient compared with free labor in the 
South, due to the use of the so-called “gang system” by slave owners. With the end of the War 
came emancipation and the end of slavery, and a once-and-for-all loss in productivity in southern 
agriculture (Fogel and Engerman 1974, 1979; Moen 1992). Other potential causes of the relative 
decline in southern income per capita incomes include a reduction in the rate of growth of the 
demand for southern cotton (Temin 1979), as well as the possibility that per capita incomes in 
the South in 1860 may have been above their long-run trend (Wright 1979). 
  Recent work by Margo (2003) has examined this issue from the perspective of regional 
                                                           
 
13  Caselli and Coleman (2001) argue that the costs of acquiring education fell as reductions in 
transportation costs in rural areas allowed schools to exploit economies of scale, as school curricula was 
transformed in the early twentieth century, as life expectancy rose over time, and as desegregation 
improved the access to education for blacks.   17
wage gaps. Wright (1986) points out that, at the turn of the twentieth century, the South - 
particularly the South Atlantic - was a low-wage region in a high-wage country. The South ca. 
1900 could have been low-wage due to recent economic shocks. Or it could have been low-wage 
for some time - that is, predating the Civil War. Margo presents a variety of data on wages in the 
South relative to the North, before and after the Civil War. His results show that all three 
explanations have merit. Wages in the South Atlantic regions were below those in the North 
before the Civil War, although not in the South Central regions. Wages in the South also 
declined relative to the North in the 1890s, possibly due to a short-run decline in agricultural 
productivity. However, the data clearly show that the war left an imprint on the regional wage 
structure - as was true of per capita incomes, wages in the South declined sharply relative to the 
North between 1860 and 1870.  
  Why was convergence delayed so long? Economic historians have suggested several 
answers to this question. One answer emphasizes the “flawed” economic institutions of the 
South, particularly in agriculture, after the war (Ransom and Sutch 1977). Another explanation, 
due to Wright, involves network externalities in labor markets. In the North, according to Wright 
(1986), jobs in manufacturing were allocated not by an impersonal labor market, but by one 
dominated by personal contacts and references. However, the Southerners, consumed by the 
turbulence of reconstruction, failed to develop these employment networks. As a result, the jobs 
in the North went to immigrants rather than to Southerners. Only after immigration was abruptly 
cut off during and after World War I did northern manufacturers turn to the South for their labor 
supply (Collins 1997). 
  Another explanation of the slow pace of Southern recovery emphasizes the poor quality  18
of education in the region. Using census data, Margo (1990) establishes that the probability that a 
Southern-born individual left the region was a positive function of schooling; that is, 
interregional migrants were better educated than those that stayed behind. This factor was 
particularly important for blacks, who attended racially segregated schools that generally were 
inferior in quality to that of schools attended by whites. 
III. U.S. Urban Development.  
  The U.S. transformed itself from a rural to an urban society between the nineteenth and 
the twentieth centuries. The onset of industrialization and the expansion of domestic markets 
significantly increased the number and size of cities. By the turn of the twentieth century, 
America became an urban nation. The spatial structures of cities changed markedly over time as 
well. Initially, cities were compact and dense. Over time, boundaries of cities increased as firms 
and households moved further away from the city center. In this section, we examine the growth 
of cities and the changes in the spatial structures of cities over time. 
  In addition, we examine factors that differentiate urban from rural areas. Unlike rural 
places, population sizes of cities varied systematically at any given point in time. While the 
relationship has not remained constant over time, the size distribution has been usefully 
characterized by the rank size rule or by Zipf’s law. Moreover, urban places have been centers of 
inventive activity, culture, entertainment, government and a magnet for immigrants. Urban 
places fostered higher productivity and higher nominal wages. Unfortunately, for a time in U.S. 
history, urban places were also extremely unhealthy and mortality rates of urban areas far 
exceeded those of rural areas.  
  Cities in the Colonial Period  19
  The colonial British America was predominantly rural. In 1690, there were only four 
cities with populations greater than 2,500. Boston was the largest city with a population of 7,000 
with Philadelphia and New York trailing behind with populations near 4,000. During the next 
one hundred years from 1690 to 1790, the number of cities rose from 4 to 24, yet the share of the 
urban population fell from 8.3 to 5.1% (see Table 2). For the only extended time in American 
history, the rural population grew faster than the urban population. The rank of cities also shifted 
over this period; Philadelphia emerged as the largest city during the mid-eighteenth century but 
then gave way to New York towards the end of the century. 
  The colonial urban occupational structure differed greatly from the rest of the nation. 
Whereas the great majority of the general population was engaged in agriculture, most of the 
urban population was engaged in mercantile, manufacturing and other service activities. 
Historians have constructed occupational structures of various colonial cities using tax records 
and directories for the late eighteenth century. According to Price (1974), based on information 
for Boston, Philadelphia and New York, an average of 23% of the population was employed in 
mercantile or commercial activities, 24% in manufacturing, 50% in services and 4% in 
government.
14 Thus, despite the reputation of port cities as centers of mercantile activity, the 
industrial and service sectors were responsible for the majority of the labor force.  
  The cities in the colonial period arose along the eastern seaboard. Urban economists 
believe that port cities arise because of increasing returns and because geography bestowed on 
them lower transport costs.
15 However, few mainstream urban economists have examined the 
rise of port cities in the colonial period. Most of what is known about cities in this period derives 
                                                           
 
14  Also see Warner (1968).   
 
15  Fujita and Mori (1996) and Konishi (2000).   20
from the work of historians. While these works are rarely guided by explicit economic theory, 
most scholars seem to believe that merchants became concentrated in cities to benefit from 
information spillovers. Merchants gathered regularly in coffee shops and exchanges to discuss 
market conditions in Europe and the West Indies.
16 
  Most historians believe that port cities arose in places endowed with excellent harbors 
and access to a rich hinterland.
17 Due to high interregional transportation and communications 
costs, the size of the hinterland determined the size of a city’s mercantile activity and the quality 
of the port determined the costs of transportation overseas  Yet, while this thesis may explain the 
rise of cities like New York and Philadelphia in the Middle Colonies or even Boston in New 
England, it does not easily explain why there were no major cities in the Upper South, and why 
cities in New England were so numerous. The Chesapeake region had excellent navigable waters 
and a rich hinterland; on the other hand, New England’s hinterland was relatively small.  
  Historians have proposed a variety of theories to explain the absence of cities in the 
Upper South, but the most attractive theory is based on colonial regulation of trade.
18 According 
                                                           
 
16  See Albion (1939); also see Burrows and Wallace (1999).  
 
17  Boston, the largest port city in the U.S. until the mid-seventeenth century, possessed an 
excellent, deep, sheltered harbor, and a hinterland composed of coastal settlements from Cape Cod to 
Maine; Philadelphia, the premier city between the mid- to the end of the seventeenth century, possessed 
an excellent agricultural hinterland but a harbor subject to freezing in winter; New York, the foremost city 
from the early eighteenth century, possessed a harbor unparalleled as well as a rich agricultural hinterland 
(see Price (1974)). 
 
18  Two of the more prominent explanations for the lack of cities in the Upper South are the 
abundance of navigable waters in the Chesapeake and that tobacco required little processing (see 
Middleton (1953), Carville (1992)). Neither of these explanations seem satisfactory. First, if mercantile 
activity in tobacco is subject to spillovers, then lower transportation costs should foster rather than deter 
the concentration of merchants in cities. Second, it is not clear that the processing of wheat or other crops 
was any more extensive than that of tobacco. In any case, forward linkages associated with wheat 
processing seem an unlikely explanation for significant agglomeration economies in Philadelphia or New 
York.  21
to Price (1974), the lack of cities in the Chesapeake is accounted for by British regulation of 
tobacco trade. The Navigation Acts restricted exports of tobacco to England whereas similar 
restrictions did not apply for fish, wheat, corn, pork, beef, etc. In addition, regulations and high 
customs duties greatly restricted entry into the tobacco trade. For both of these reasons, a handful 
of merchants coordinated the tobacco trade from London and Glasgow rather than from cities in 
the Chesapeake.
19 By contrast, merchants in New York or Philadelphia exported their products to 
many markets, and entry into the business was relatively open. For these merchants, regular 
meetings in coffee houses provided valuable information spillovers on local and overseas market 
conditions as well as information on trustworthy contacts and potential partners.
20 Thus, when 
Baltimore and Alexandria and other cities arose in the Upper South in the mid-eighteenth 
century, their activity was based on wheat rather than on tobacco.
21 
  Despite the fact that most scholars believe that port cities arose for mercantile reasons, 
the occupation structures of cities indicate that the number of merchants were equaled by artisans 
and surpassed by service workers. Urban artisans, working alone or with an apprentice, produced 
a wide variety of products such as barrels, kegs, bread, candles, soaps, etc. Why did artisans 
locate in cities? Historians and economists seem to rarely ask this question. The most likely 
answer is transportation costs. Due to high transportation costs, except for trade in export staples, 
most cities produced goods for local consumption. As local demand for manufactures grew, 
artisans emerged in cities to satisfy this demand. Services in cities, such as tavern and inn 
keeping, can be explained in a similar manner. Thus, the concentration of artisans and service 
                                                           
 
19  See Price and Clemens (1987). 
 
20  See Doerflinger (1986). 
 
21  See Klingaman (1969).  22
workers added greatly to an urban economy, but these activities alone did not sustain an urban 
area during this period. 
  Urbanization and Industrialization 
  In the United States, there was a strong correlation between industrialization and 
urbanization. While cities existed in the pre-industrial era, the rapid growth in the number and 
size of cities coincided with the development of a manufacturing economy. Moreover, cities 
were concentrated in regions where industrialization began. Table 2 and Figure 4 show that in 
the early phase of industrialization, urban population grew from 7% in 1820 to 20% in 1860. 
Between 1820 and 1860, urban population grew by an average of 57% per decade. Moreover, the 
cities became significantly larger. In 1820, there was only one city with a population above 
100,000; in 1860, there were 9. Throughout this period, New York remained the largest city with 
its population increasing from 123,706 to 805,651. The urban population in the first half of the 
nineteenth century was concentrated in the Northeast region where industrialization began. For 
these Northeastern cities, Williamson and Swanson (1966) find that manufacturing accounted for 
approximately 60% of the labor force during this period. 
  Did industrialization cause urbanization in the U.S.? The accepted view in the 
development literature is that urbanization and industrialization go hand in hand. Labor saving 
technological change combined with innovation and development of new manufactured and 
service products spur the growth of urban areas where products are most efficiently produced. 
However, did industrialization lead urbanization or vice versa? 
  While few studies examine this question directly, the existing literature hints at the 
possibility that industrialization led urbanization. First, the Goldin-Sokoloff hypothesis on U.S.  23
early industrialization argues that industrialization first began in rural areas where the 
opportunity cost of women and children relative to men were low. Although the Goldin-Sokoloff 
model does not address the issue of industrialization and urbanization, the fact that 
industrialization is seen to arise in rural areas suggests that industrialization preceded 
urbanization. Thus, in the Northeast rural regions, cities arose as manufacturing developed in 
these areas. 
  Williamson’s (1965) work on urban growth during early industrialization seems to 
confirm the view that industrialization led urbanization. If urbanization caused industrialization, 
then industrialization should take place in large urban areas which formed prior to 
industrialization. Moreover, larger cities rather than smaller cities or rural areas should 
industrialize and grow faster over time. However, contrary to expectations, Williamson (1965) 
finds that rates of urbanization converged rather than diverged between 1790 and 1890. During 
this period, rural areas urbanized more rapidly than the developed urban areas. In addition, 
according to Williamson and Swanson, urban growth was consistently unrelated to the initial size 
of cities and younger cities grew faster than older cities. 
  The U.S. became a mature industrial economy between the second half of the nineteenth 
and the early twentieth centuries. America also became an urban nation during this period. By 
1920, more than half of the population lived in cities. In this period, based on a sample of cities, 
Weiss (1974) finds that slightly less than 50% of the labor force was engaged in manufacturing, 
50% in services, and a tiny fraction in agriculture. The rise of an industrial economy was 
accompanied by the rise of the manufacturing belt as industrialization moved westward but not 
southward. Once again, as with early industrialization, there was high geographic correlation  24
between later industrialization and urbanization as the urban population was highly concentrated 
in the industrial belt. In addition, the cities in this region were significantly more oriented toward 
manufacturing than those in other regions. The cities in the New England, Middle Atlantic and 
East North Central regions had twice the labor force allocated to manufacturing than that of 
cities in other regions.
22 
  Despite the historical importance of urbanization during this period, the topic has 
received limited attention from economists and economic historians in recent years. The most 
widely shared interpretation of the rise of cities in this period is based on pecuniary and 
Marshallian externalities. Meyer (1983, 1988) emphasizes pecuniary externalities; for Meyer, the 
manufacturing belt is really an agglomeration of regional urban city systems. Ades and Glaeser 
(1999) find that initial development proxied by urbanization in 1850 was significantly correlated 
with later urban development. Thus, increasing returns led to divergent urban development. 
However, Ades and Glaeser find openness or the extension of markets was negatively correlated 
with urban growth. 
  Kim (2000) argues that the location of cities was largely driven by superior access to 
resources and that cities arose to take advantage of economies in local public goods and in 
transportation. A variety of factors suggest that the concentration of manufacturing cities in the 
industrial belt resulted from that region’s comparative advantage in resources. First, the cities in 
the industrial belt were specialized in manufacturing. They had a significantly higher proportion 
of the labor force engaged in manufacturing than cities in other regions. Second, within the 
manufacturing sector, the cities were highly specialized in one or two industries and cities within 
a region tended to specialize in the same set of industries. City specialization in a few industries 
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might signal the importance of localization economies, but it cannot explain why cities within 
regions tended to specialize in the same set of industries. Third, the rise of the Midwestern cities 
in the industrial belt was correlated with the growing importance of primary metals, machinery, 
and transportation industries.  
  Urbanization in the Twentieth Century 
  The pattern of urban development in the second half of the twentieth century differed in 
nature and scope from the industrial period (see Table 2 and Figure 4). First, the pace of 
urbanization slowed. The share of population in cities rose modestly from 51.2% to 61.6% 
between 1920 and 1990. Second, Table 3 and Figure 5 show that the urban population became 
increasingly more suburbanized in metropolitan areas; in 1940, there were 138 metropolitan 
areas in the U.S. which contained 51% of the U.S. population. However, in 1990, the number of 
metropolitan areas in the U.S. rose to 335 as did the share of population in these areas to 77.5%.  
In this period, the industrial structure of cities shifted dramatically into services. By the end of 
the twentieth century, the percentage of employment in services reached almost three times that 
of manufacturing (see Kolko (1999)). 
  The patterns of urbanization in the second half of the twentieth century exhibited marked 
regional convergence. The regional distribution of cities became more even as the shares fell in 
the Northeast and the Midwest and rose in the West. While economic structures of cities 
continued to differ by size, they converged rapidly across regions. Kim (1995, 2000) suggests 
that these trends, like those of regions, are roughly consistent with diminished differences in 
regional comparative advantage. During this period, regional input supplies became more similar 
as factors became more mobile and as technical advances reduced regional differences in inputs.  26
The shift in industrial structure toward services further reduced the importance of differences in 
resources. Thus, the convergence of geographic differences in resources accounts for the 
convergence of city industrial structure as well as the convergence of the geographic distribution 
of cities across regions.  
  It is beyond the scope of this section to summarize the literature on modern twentieth 
century data. For excellent reviews, we refer the reader to Duranton and Puga (2004) and 
Rosenthal and Strange (2004). Since some kind of agglomeration economies are needed to 
generate cities, the literature on cities attempts to identify which sources of agglomeration 
economies are most important for urban development. Here, we highlight a few papers that 
possess long-run historical dimension. Two of these studies emphasize the role of Marshallian 
externalities. Simon and Nardinelli (2002) find that cities with higher levels of human capital in 
1880 grew faster over the next one hundred years, suggesting the importance of knowledge 
spillovers. Beeson, DeJong, and Troesken (2001) find that initial advantages have persistent 
results for a much longer period in U.S. history. However, Rappaport and Sachs (2001) argues 
that geography, especially access to coasts of both oceans and Great Lakes play an important role 
in explaining population distribution and density. Mitchner and McLean find that states with 
navigable waterways, large mineral endowment, and no slaves in 1860 had higher labor 
productivity levels between 1880 and 1980. 
  Spatial Structures of Cities and Metropolitan Areas 
  The land use patterns of U.S. urban areas have changed dramatically over time. In the 
colonial period, cities were small, compact and densely organized near the waterfront. Between 
the nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries, urban boundaries increased as outlying areas  27
were annexed. However, cities generally became more dense as population migrated to cities and 
building density in downtowns rose. The land-use patterns of urban areas changed dramatically 
in the second half of the twentieth century. As population moved further away from city centers, 
outside traditional municipal boundaries, a new definition of urban areas emerged based on the 
metropolitan area. In this period, urban densities declined dramatically as density in city centers 
fell and as urban boundaries increased ever more outwards. In this section, we use the density 
gradient, which measures changes in density as one moves further away from the city center, and 
average density, defined simply as persons per square mile, to study the historical trends in urban 
spatial structures. 
  A. Density Gradients 
  Due to data limitations, it is difficult to construct data on spatial structures of cities until 
the late nineteenth century. However, using federal census documents, tax records and the city 
directory for Philadelphia in 1790, Schweitzer (1993) was able to identify the locations of 
residence and occupation of a majority of inhabitants in Philadelphia in 1790. Schweitzer finds 
that the population density gradient was very steep and population densities were significantly 
lower just a few city blocks away from the waterfront on the Delaware River. Schweitzer also 
finds that there was significant spatial differentiation by socioeconomic groups. Most merchants 
lived near the waterfront, artisans were distributed throughout the city, the wealthy were 
clustered in an area known as the New Society Hill, and the poor were found everywhere but 
disproportionately present in the outskirts of the city. 
  One of the most striking empirical regularities in urban economics is the consistent 
decline in density gradients of cities over time. Mills (1972) finds that density gradients of four  28
metropolitan areas, Baltimore, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, and Rochester, declined more or less 
monotonically over time between 1880 and 1963.
23 Macauley (1985) estimates that, for a sample 
of 18 metropolitan areas, density gradients in population and employment for manufacturing, 
retailing, wholesaling and services all tended to decline over the twentieth century. Similar 
trends are found by Edmonston (1975) for a larger sample of metropolitan areas as well as for 
the same sample of cities as Mills.  
  The Alonso-Muth-Mills monocentric city model provides a number of possible 
explanations as to why urban population or employment might eventually decentralize or why 
the density gradient might fall. According to this model, households choose where to reside 
within an urban area, given their tastes for housing versus other goods. To make this concrete, 
imagine that households maximize a utility function U(h, x, t) where h = housing services, x = a 
composite commodity, and t = leisure. The budget constraint is p(r)h + x = A + w(T – cr – t), 
where p(r) is the price of housing at distance r from the central business district (CBD), A is non-
labor income, T is the household’s time endowment, w is the wage per unit of time, and c is time 
spent commuting per unit of distance r from the CBD. Employment in this model is concentrated 
in the CBD but households may choose to live at various points r from the CBD. The model can 
readily accommodate fixed or variable monetary costs of commuting but for our purposes it is 
not necessary to include these. 
  In this model the variable r serves as the indicator of “suburbanization” because higher 
values of r correspond to distances further from the urban “core” (the CBD). The first order 
condition for r is p’h = -wc. This equation will hold at non-zero values of r because the slope of 
                                                           
 
23  Mills’ (1972) estimate of Philadelphia’s density gradient for the late nineteenth century is 
considerably lower than that of the other three cities. However, Mills believes that the low estimate may 
have been due to problems with data construction associated with Philadelphia.  29
the pricing function, p’, is negative – housing price declines as distance r from the CBD 
increases. In choosing its optimal location, each household trades off a lower price of housing 
versus higher commuting costs.  
  If housing is a normal good – and all empirical studies suggest that it is – it is 
straightforward to demonstrate that dr/dA > 0. That is, an increase in non-labor income will 
cause the household to live further away from the CBD – to suburbanize.  The demand for 
housing increases (because A has increased), and the household chooses optimally to locate 
further away where housing price is lower. However, an increase in w has off-setting income and 
substitution effects. The income effect of an increase in w is the same as the effect of an increase 
in A, as long as housing is a normal good. But the substitution effect goes in the opposite 
direction because a higher wage means a higher time cost of commuting. If the income effect 
outweighs the substitution effect, an increase in w will imply an increase in r, that is, a distance 
further from the CBD.  
  In the Alonso-Muth-Mills model, higher income households choose to suburbanize 
because they demand more housing relative to other goods, and the relative price of housing of 
land is cheaper at locations that are distant from the CBD than at locations that are close in. Of 
course, there may be other reasons why higher income households choose to live in the suburbs. 
It is possible, for example, that suburban local governments might be more efficient at providing 
local public goods, such as education, and these goods could be income-elastic. Models of 
jurisdictional “sorting” – the archetype being the Tiebout model – imply that households sort 
across local governments on the basis of their demands for local public goods. Such sorting may 
be reinforced by “peer group” effects – the quality of the local public schools, for example, may  30
be affected by socioeconomic backgrounds of the students that attend them. 
  The existence of a density gradient for Philadelphia in 1790 presents a puzzle for the 
monocentric city model. In that model, the density gradient is generated by the commuting 
choice of households. However, in this period, very few people commuted to work. Most people 
worked where they lived. Thus, it is more likely that the density gradient was caused by the fact 
that businesses found it desirable to locate near the waterfront on the Delaware River (see Fujita 
and Ogawa (1982), Berliant, Peng and Wang (2002), Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002), and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2003) for possible explanations.) 
  The decline in the density gradient or the decentralization of employment and population, 
especially in the second half of the twentieth century, is often attributed to developments in 
transportation and rising incomes. Glaeser and Kahn (2004) argue that the adoption of 
automobiles and trucks fundamentally transformed how Americans live and work in the latter 
half of the twentieth century. Automobiles and trucks lowered transportation costs and, just as 
importantly, eliminated fixed costs associated with rail depots and ports. The decline in 
agglomeration economies associated with these fixed costs enabled firms and households to 
decentralize and organize their activities around a more dispersed environment. 
  Margo (1992) finds that rising incomes also played an important role in suburbanization. 
Margo uses the public use sample of the 1950 census, which provides information on household 
and personal characteristics, including whether households living in metropolitan areas reside in 
central cities or suburban rings. Margo estimates a cross-sectional logistic regression of the 
probability of suburban residence as a function of household characteristics, including household 
income, which is instrumented. The model is identified by assuming that education and industry  31
of employment affect income, but do not otherwise (that is, independently) affect the likelihood 
of a suburban residence. The estimated coefficient on income in this regression is positive and 
highly significant. 
  Using this coefficient in conjunction with the mean growth of real household income 
between 1950 and 1980, Margo predicts that the percent suburbanized should have increased by 
7.4 percentage points. The actual increase was 17.5 percentage points (from 42.7 to 60.2 
percent). Thus, according to Margo’s calculation, changes in income account for about 43 
percent of suburbanization over the 1950 to 1980 period. It is likely that this estimate is biased 
upwards, for several reasons. First, education and industry may not be proper instruments. For 
example, education may have a direct impact on the likelihood of a suburban residence, if better-
educated parents value their children’s schooling, and suburban schools, as most studies indicate, 
are superior in quality to urban schools. Similarly, industry may have a direct effect on the 
likelihood of suburban residence, if industries differ in their ability to substitute land for other 
inputs. As a result, some industries locate further away from the CBD than others, and their 
workers follow suit. 
  Second, as Margo (1992, p. 308) notes, some central cities expanded their boundaries by 
annexing suburban areas after 1950. Had jurisdictional boundaries remained constant between 
1950 and 1980, the increase in the proportion suburbanizing after 1950 would have greater than 
17.5 percentage points. Third, Margo’s calculation is partial equilibrium. In particular, it does not 
take into account induced effects on price of housing in the suburbs relative to central cities.  
These effects are positive – house values should (and did, see Collins and Margo 2002) rise in 
the suburbs relative to the central cities, dampening the incentive to suburbanize due to rising  32
incomes. 
  It is important to recognize that Margo’s calculation does not identify precisely why 
higher income households suburbanize. This could be because of the causal mechanism 
identified by the Alonso-Muth-Mills model, or it could be for some other reason. Glaeser, Kahn, 
and Vigdor (2001) argue, in fact, that the reason emphasized in the Alonso-Mills model – land 
prices – is not the reason why “[t]he poor live in cities.” Rich people, Glaeser, et. al, agree, do 
have a higher demand for land than poor people, but the income elasticity of the demand for land 
is not high enough to explain the positive association between income and suburban residence. 
Poor people, their argument continues, live in cities because the poor place a high value on 
public transportation. In Glaeser, et.al.’s modification of the Alonso-Mill’s model, the marginal 
monetary cost of public transportation is cheap, but the fixed and time costs are large relative to 
automobile transport.  
  B. Urban Densities 
  While the density gradient and other measures of decentralization are informative, we 
believe that a study of simple average density of cities provides a fuller picture of urban spatial 
structures. Shammas (2000) finds that colonial cities were compact and dense. In 1800, data on 
sample of four cities (Philadelphia, New York, Baltimore and Boston) indicate that each city 
consisted of less than 2 square miles of area. Population densities of these cities ranged from 
Boston’s 20,781 to Philadelphia’s 45,800 persons per square mile. The differences in population 
densities in these cities reflected their differences in housing lot sizes. It appears that 
Philadelphia’s high density relative to other cities was due to its relatively small house lot sizes. 
While Philadelphians averaged 7.1 compared to Boston’s 8.7 persons per dwelling,  33
Philadelphia’s house lot sizes only averaged 1,392 square feet as compared to Boston’s 3,441. 
  Unfortunately, systematic information on urban land areas is available only from 1890 
onwards with the publication of the Social Statistics of Cities. Kim (2002) finds that urban 
densities rose and fell between the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Between 1890 and 
1950, average population density rose from 7,230 to 8,876 persons per square mile for a 
consistent sample of cities whose population was greater than 25,000 (see Table 4 and Figure 
6).
24 During this period, the cities also annexed considerable amounts of land. In 1890, the cities 
averaged approximately 19 square miles of land; by 1950, they averaged 40 square miles. Yet, 
despite the significant increases in the boundaries of cities, population density rose as urban 
population growth outpaced annexation. However, in the second half of the twentieth century, 
the average population density of cities declined substantially. By 1990, average population 
density fell to 5,647 persons per square mile. In this period, cities continued to annex nearby 
areas, but urban population growth did not keep pace with annexation. For metropolitan areas, 
Kim (2002) finds that average density rose between 1940 and 1960 but then fell sharply between 
1960 and 1990. 
  The combined information from urban densities and density gradients presents a more 
coherent picture of the changes in urban spatial structures between the late nineteenth and the 
twentieth centuries. The average densities of urban areas rose and fell over time; however, 
density gradients of urban areas declined monotonically over time. These two trends can be 
reconciled accordingly. Between 1890 and 1950, the density gradient curve shifted upward but 
its slope fell, causing urban density to rise even as the density gradient declined. However, 
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for a smaller subset of metropolitan areas.  34
between 1950 and 1990, the density gradient curve shifted downward as its slope continued to 
fall, causing urban density to decline sharply.  
  By concentrating most of their empirical analysis on the density gradient, largely 
motivated by the monocentric city model, Kim (2002) argues that urban economists have under-
emphasized the location decisions of firms and its impact on urban spatial structures. Although 
falling transportation costs and rising incomes tended to disperse households outwards, Kim 
suggests that firm agglomeration economies in manufacturing and business services may have 
contributed to the rise in urban density during the first half of the twentieth century. Moreover, 
advances in skyscraper technologies lowered the costs of dense employment, especially for 
sectors that used office space. However, in the second half of the twentieth century, the decline 
in the importance of agglomeration economies in employment, re-enforced by household’s 
preference for living in larger housing away from the city center, is likely to have contributed to 
the decline in average urban density as well as the continuing decline in the density gradient.
25  
  C. Urban Land Rents 
  With some notable exceptions, twentieth century evidence on land price implications of 
the monocentric city model is extremely limited. This is simply because, in most urban areas, 
vacant land parcels are relatively few in number and are vacant (rather than developed) for non-
random reasons. Historical studies offer more promise, but until recently, most such studies have 
been based on a single data set, that for Chicago originally compiled by Homer Hoyt (1933; 
                                                           
 
25  Kain (1968) argues that the relative and absolute decline of central cities is the result of several 
important technological changes. First, developments in transportation have made land much more 
substitutable. With trucks and automobiles, firms no longer need to locate near ports, freight and 
passenger terminals and rail lines. Second, changes in production methods that require spacious, single-
story plants have made it more attractive for firms to build plants in outlying areas where land is cheaper. 
Finally, technological changes in communications and data processing have reduced the need for armies 
of white collar workers employed in central city offices.    35
exceptions include Edel and Sclar’s (1979) study of Boston land prices, Gin and Sonstelie’s 
(1992) analysis of Philadelphia, and Smith’s (2001) study of land values in Cleveland). 
Representative studies based on the Hoyt data include Mills (1969), McDonald and Bowman 
(1979), Kau and Sirmans (1979), Kau, Lee, and Sirmans (1986), and McMillan, Jarmin, and 
Thorsnes (1992). 
  A few recent studies, however, have examined archival data for cities other than Chicago. 
Using data culled from newspaper advertisements, Margo (1996) studies the relationship 
between rental price of housing and distance from the CBD in antebellum New York. Although 
Margo’s study is not, strictly speaking, about the price of land, he nevertheless finds a relatively 
steep rental price gradient. Atack and Margo (1998) also use newspaper listings to study sale 
prices of vacant land in New York City over the period 1835 to 1900. Atack and Margo also find 
a steep negative gradient between the price of land and distance, but one which was flattening 
over time. The steep rental gradient is consistent with the high cost of intra-urban transport 
before the Civil War and the flattening of the vacant land price gradient is also consistent with 
what is known about post-bellum technological improvements in urban transportation. Atack and 
Margo’s other important finding is a marked increase in the value of vacant land in New York 
after the Civil War. The increase in value between 1860 and 1870 is well in excess of the general 
rise in the price level at the time, and the increase was sustained after the price level began to fall 
in the 1870s. This rise in land values coincides, of course, with the economic ascendance of New 
York after the Civil War as a premier financial and manufacturing center. 
  Size Distribution of Cities 
  From the earliest period in American history, cities varied considerably in their  36
populations at any given point in time. Madden (1956) finds that the size distributions of cities 
for every decade between 1790 and 1950 were remarkably stable and that they can be usefully 
summarized by the rank-size rule. Dobkins and Ioannides (2000) and Black and Henderson 
(2002) provide estimates for the Pareto distribution or the rank-size rule for metropolitan areas 
between 1900 and 1990. We refer the reader to Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) for an extremely 
useful summary of the literature on the size distribution of cities.  
  While there is considerable debate as to what forces are responsible for the size 
distribution of cities, most economic historians have emphasized the role of markets and 
transportation nodes.
26 Weiman (1988) argues that the initial growth of Atlanta was due to its 
strategic location at the intersection of three railroads, but that its emergence as a regional 
metropolis was accounted for its development as a mercantile and financial center that cleared 
regional transactions. Odell and Weiman (1998) suggest that the founding of the Federal Reserve 
Banks in Dallas and Atlanta was due to their positions as regional centers of commerce and 
finance in the lower South. 
  Why do cities lower the costs of trade? Every trade must overcome two types of costs: 
transportation and information. Since goods are traded over space, they must incur transportation 
costs. In addition, specialization reduces the information set of agents. As compared to a more 
self-sufficient economy, information on demand and supply are geographically more dispersed. 
Specialization also exacerbates the problems of asymmetric information where sellers are more 
informed about the quality of their product than the buyers. The concentration of merchants, 
exchanges, insurance firms, lawyers, judges, etc. in larger cities lowers the costs of trade by 
providing better market information on supply and demand for goods and by solving the 
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asymmetric information problem.
27 Kim (2000) finds that the size distribution of cities is partly 
explained by the concentration of transaction services in the larger cities. 
  William Cronon’s (1991) Nature’s Metropolis provides an excellent illustration on the 
role of markets in causing the rise of Chicago. While Cronon’s work is loosely based on 
Christaller’s central place theory, scholars find his distinction between “first nature” (natural 
landscape) and “second nature” (human actions) particularly useful. Cronon argues that the 
growth of Chicago was due as much to “second nature” than to “first nature.”
28  Although 
Cronon’s definition of “second nature” is rather all encompassing, many urban scholars like 
Krugman (1996) have interpreted “second nature” as indicating the importance of increasing 
returns that is often self-reinforcing. Cronon’s various case studies of wheat, lumber, meat, 
capital and reapers provide us with a good sense of what he means by “second nature.” 
  While each case study is somewhat idiosyncratic, the case of wheat is illustrative. There 
is no doubt that Chicago was endowed with a rich hinterland west of the Great Lakes for 
growing wheat. Without first nature, no wheat would flow to Chicago.
29 However, St. Louis, not 
                                                           
 
27  Ogawa and Fujita (1980) and Imai (1982) provide models of agglomeration based on the 
exchange of information. In their model, firms own bits of information and due to its public goods nature, 
the benefits of face to face communications rise with the number of firms. In their model, communication 
is costly as the exchange of information requires organization and time (see Fujita and Thisse, 2000.) 
 
28  Cronon (1991, 56-57) writes: “A kind of ‘second nature,’ designed by people and ‘improved’ 
toward human ends, gradually emerged atop the original landscape that nature - ‘first nature’ - had 
created such an inconvenient jumble. Despite the subtly differing logic that lay behind each, the 
geography of second nature was in its own way as compelling as the geography of first nature, so boosters 
and others often forgot the distinction between them. Both seemed quite ‘natural.’ Nowhere was this more 
true than in the new artificial transportation technologies that changed the ways people and commodities 
moved back and forth between city and country... Second nature defined the corridors of commerce at 
least as much as first nature.” 
 
29  Lumber illustrates the primacy of first nature. When the supply of white pines from its 
hinterland diminished, Chicago’s wholesale market in lumber declined as well. In addition, unlike grain, 
Chicago’s advantages in the lumber trade were linked to transporting timber via the Great Lakes rather 
than railroads.  38
Chicago, was the major destination of wheat when transportation was based on water. The 
“second nature” advantages of Chicago were tied to the coming of the railroads. The railroads 
and the steam-powered grain elevator fundamentally changed how wheat was transported. Under 
the water-based marketing system, wheat was transported as sacks of grain; under the railroad-
based system, grain was shipped freely in carloads. The railroad, as compared to water 
transportation, enjoyed significant economies of scale and labor-saving benefits.
30 
  Yet, while the increase in productivity of transportation and storage may explain why 
grain was shipped to Chicago rather than to St. Louis, it does not explain why grain was shipped 
to these cities in the first place. Why did farmers not simply sell their products to merchants or 
consumers in the cities of final destination? Why did wheat move through Chicago or St. Louis?  
Cronon’s answer is “second nature.” “By imposing their own order and vocabulary on the world 
of first nature, the city’s traders invented a world of second nature in which they could buy and 
sell grain as commodity almost independently from grain as crop (Cronon, 1991, 146).” Once 
quality was assured with the adoption of a standard grading system by the Chicago Board of 
Trade, buyers and sellers across the country could trade grain without sampling it in advance. In 
addition, the concentration of grain exchanges in Chicago meant that the posted trading prices 
provided instant information on grain market conditions of the entire nation. 
  Urbanization and Inventive Activity 
  The industrialization of the U.S. economy was accompanied by a significant increase in 
                                                           
 
30  Cronon (1991, 113-114) writes: “The economic benefits of such efficient handling were so 
great that moving a bushel of grain from railroad car to lake vessel cost only half a cent, giving Chicago a 
more than tenfold advantage over St. Louis.” According to Cronon, St. Louis did not construct grain 
elevators until the end of the Civil War because, unlike the railroad owners, river interests faced high 
coordination costs and because the changing height of the Mississippi River made it impractical to build 
one on the levee.  39
inventive activity. Sokoloff (1988) finds that the expansion of markets brought on by canals in 
the early nineteenth century significantly increased inventive activity. Sokoloff and Kahn (1990) 
show that the growth of inventive activity in this period was due to inventions of ordinary 
citizens with common skills and knowledge. However, Kahn and Sokoloff  and Lamoreaux and 
Sokoloff (1999) find that, over time, more and more inventors became career specialists who 
produced patents that were sold or leased. Thus, unlike during the second half of the twentieth 
century when research and development was mostly done by firms in-house, Lamoreaux and 
Sokoloff find that most patented inventions in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth 
centuries were traded in the marketplace. 
  Inventive activity was concentrated in urban areas. In the early nineteenth century, Pred 
(1973) finds that the three largest cities, New York, Philadelphia, and Boston were responsible 
for over 20% of all patents granted (also see Feller (1971)). However, while Sokoloff (1988) also 
finds that per capita patenting rates were significantly higher in urban areas during this period, he 
also notes that patenting was concentrated in the Southern New England and New York regions, 
and that both urban and rural places in these regions had disproportionately higher rates of 
patenting than elsewhere. In the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, Lamoreaux and 
Sokoloff (1999) show that patents were concentrated in the New England, Middle Atlantic and 
the East North Central regions and that per capita patenting rates were positively correlated with 
city size. 
  The concentration of inventive and innovative activities in urban areas is often interpreted 
as providing evidence for the importance of information spillovers in generating new ideas. 
Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1999) write that the concentration of patent agents and attorneys and  40
the availability of a wide array of publications such as the Scientific American promoted the 
diffusion of technological knowledge in the Northeast and in urban centers. However, an 
alternative explanation is also possible. Patent agents and patent attorneys were intermediaries 
who facilitated trade in inventions, and like other intermediaries, it is not surprising that they 
were concentrated in urban areas. However, why should inventors reside in cities if not for 
information spillovers? Lamoreaux and Sokoloff note that it was not a simple matter for 
inventors to obtain property rights to their inventions. Potential ideas had to be shepherded 
through the Patent Office application process and then protected in court in cases of 
infringement. Thus, inventors may have chosen to locate near patent agents and lawyers because 
access to these intermediaries lowered the costs of securing property rights to their inventions as 
well as lowering the transactions costs of marketing their inventions. 
  Urbanization and Productivity 
  Direct historical information linking urban locations to productivity are minimal. In his 
study of economies of scale in ante-bellum manufacturing, Sokoloff (1984) finds that firms 
located in more urbanized counties had higher levels of total factor productivity. Using a sample 
of manufacturing firms from the 1880 census, Atack, Bateman and Margo (2003) find that urban 
establishments were more productive, all other factors held constant, than rural establishments.  
  There is a considerable body of evidence showing that, throughout most of U.S. history, 
urban wages were higher - sometimes markedly so - in nominal terms than rural wages. Sokoloff 
and Villaflor (1992) find that in the New England and Middle Atlantic regions, wages were 
higher in urban than rural areas for various years between 1820 and 1860. However, the urban-
rural wage gap declined over this period. In 1820 and 1842, nominal wages were 15-20% higher  41
in urban rather than in rural counties. In 1850, the urban-rural wage gap declined to 10% and, by 
1860, the gap was insignificant. Furthermore, Goldin and Sokoloff (1984) find that in the early 
nineteenth century male wages were positively correlated with urbanization but that female 
wages were negatively correlated. It appears that female workers who were employed in large 
textile mills near waterpower sites earned relatively higher wages. For the late nineteenth 
century, Atack, Bateman and Margo (2000) find that nominal urban wages, based on data from 
samples from the decennial census manuscripts of manufacturing, were significantly higher than 
non-urban areas in 1850 and 1880. Moreover, the data indicate that the urban-rural wage gap 
increased over this period.  
  For the twentieth century, using data on a sample of cities from every decade between 
1900 and 1990, Dobkins and Ioannides (2000) find that population size was significantly 
correlated with nominal wages. More specifically, they find that after controlling for individual, 
time and regional effects, a 10% increase in population was associated with a 1% increase in 
wages. Glaeser and Mare (2001) find that wages in large cities are 33% higher than outside 
metropolitan areas in 1990.  
  While economic historians have documented the urban-rural wage gap, few have 
attempted to explain the causes of this gap for the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. 
While most scholars believe that the urban wage premium is due to the higher productivity of 
urban workers, it is important to establish the sources of these productivity gains. It is also 
important to rule out the alternative hypothesis that the urban-rural wage gap is simply caused by 
the fact the more able workers choose to live in cities. In the early nineteenth century, Sokoloff 
(1984) finds that employees in urban firms may have been more productive because larger  42
markets led to greater division of labor. In the twentieth century, Glaeser and Mare (2001) 
suggest that urban workers were more productive because cities enabled workers to accumulate 
more human capital. 
  Urbanization and Health 
  The industrialization and urbanization of the U.S. economy between the early nineteenth 
and turn of the twentieth centuries were associated with significant increases in productivity and 
real wages. Yet, despite the fact that income per capita rose over this period, the average quality 
of health for Americans declined markedly over this period. The heights of native-born males, as 
well as life expectancy, fell between 1830 and 1890 and recovered to 1830 levels only by 1930.
31 
Since health is an important component of human welfare, Costa and Steckel (1995) estimate 
that the overall welfare of Americans may have stagnated or fallen between 1830 and 1890.  
  Economic historians suspect that much of the decline in health was associated with 
urbanization. Unfortunately, the U.S. economy industrialized and urbanized prior to the 
invention of modern medicine and public health. People living in high density areas were subject 
to greater exposure to infectious and parasitic diseases, both respiratory (air-borne) and 
gastrointestinal (water-borne). Consequently, the health of urban Americans was much worse 
than their rural counterparts. In 1900, Haines (2001) finds that life expectancy of urban 
Americans was 10 years less than rural Americans. In 1880, Higgs (1979) finds that the urban 
mortality rate was 50% higher than rural mortality; in 1890 and 1900, Condran and Crimmins 
(1980) finds that the urban-rural differential was 27% and 18% respectively. The urban-rural 
mortality differential was even more significant for infants and young children. For infants, 
excess urban mortality was 63% and 49% in 1890 and 1900, respectively and for young children 
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aged one to four, the figures were 107% and 97%, respectively. Furthermore, Costa (2000) finds 
that exposure to diseases at early ages may have had long-term health consequences. Costa finds 
that Union Army veterans who grew up in large cities faced much higher mortality rates at older 
ages. 
  The urban-rural differentials in health and mortality began to decline and reverse over the 
twentieth century. By around 1940, it was sometimes healthier to reside in urban rather than in 
rural areas. Scholars attribute the decline and elimination of excess urban mortality to improved 
public works such as sewers and water systems and advances in public health and medicine 
(Haines (2001)). However, the transition to a healthier urban environment did not occur without 
complications. In 1897, half of all municipalities installed lead pipes to deliver water. Troesken 
(2003) finds that municipalities which used lead water pipe systems experienced higher rates of 
infant mortality and stillbirths by 25% and 50% respectively.  
  Immigration and Urbanization 
  Since the early nineteenth century, immigrants have been concentrated in cities, 
especially in the North (Ward (1972)). By 1890, Easterlin (1972) shows that 53% of the urban 
population was foreign born and the presence of foreign born seems to be positively correlated 
with city sizes (see Thompson and Whelpton (1933)). In contrast, 75% of native whites lived in 
rural areas in 1890. Moreover, within cities, immigrants tended to live in close geographic 
proximity, forming distinctive ethnic neighborhoods, especially in the larger cities. 
  Why are the foreign born more attracted to urban areas than natives? Why do immigrants 
form ethnic enclaves? Borjas (1995) argues that ethnic neighborhoods in cities arise because of 
ethnic specific externalities that are captured by residents who live in close proximity. While the  44
process by which ethnic externalities are transmitted is not well understood, Borjas suggests that 
ethnic spillovers foster the accumulation of human capital that raises the productivity of workers.  
V.  Conclusion      
  The most important lesson that emerges from this review of U.S. economic geography 
from a historical perspective is that economic geography is fundamentally linked to the process 
of economic development. While no overwhelming consensus emerges on the causal relationship 
between economic geography and development, the review highlights the enormous advances 
made on this subject by economic historians in recent decades.  
  From a regional perspective, while there is continued debate on the exact causes, it is 
now widely believed that the westward migration was caused by higher productivity of labor in 
the West. Moreover, the work on early industrialization and slavery enhance our understanding 
of when and why U.S. regions diverged and converged. It appears that regional divergence began 
in the early nineteenth century as the Northeast began to industrialize. Yet, in the antebellum 
period, due to the relatively high productivity of Southern agriculture under slavery, the 
divergence was not fully reflected in the regional income per capita. In the post-bellum period, 
regional divergence was felt even more keenly due to the elimination of slavery in the South. 
However, despite the important impact of slavery on regional incomes, the root cause of the 
divergence and convergence of U.S. regional economies is likely to be related to the 
development of an industrial and post-industrial society.  
  From an urban perspective, the review indicates that cities have come full circle. In the 
colonial period, as is today, urban activities are largely based on services. However, the rise of an 
urban society was due to the rise of industrial cities. Urbanization was significantly correlated  45
with industrialization over time and across space. The number and size of cities rose with 
industrialization and cities were geographically concentrated in areas where industrialization 
began and spread. The spatial structures of cities changed markedly over time. Scholars find that 
the changes in land-use patterns are explained by falling commuting costs and rising incomes. 
We also have a much better understanding of what factors differentiate urban from rural areas. 
Inventive activity, productivity, nominal wages, immigrants, government, and entertainment all 
favor urban areas. However, urbanization was not always associated with positive developments. 
Because urbanization occurred prior to advances in modern medicine, urbanization was 
associated with a significant decline in the health of Americans. 
  The review also highlights a number of interesting puzzles and many important areas that 
remain relatively unexplored. In the colonial period, even prior to industrialization, why were 
cities and towns more abundant in New England and relatively absent in the Chesapeake? Why 
is there a rent gradient in 1790 Philadelphia when people did not commute to work? If 
industrialization and urbanization were associated with a significant deterioration of health, why 
did rural Americans migrate to urban areas in significant numbers? What are the causal 
relationships between industrialization and urbanization? If industrialization preceded 
urbanization, what kinds of agglomeration economies in manufacturing led to urbanization? In 
later industrialization, what forces led to the rise of the manufacturing belt and why did its 
importance decline in the twentieth century? Additionally, are cities, as argued by Glaeser, 
Kolko and Saiz (2001), becoming consumer cities? 
  Finally, we point to two neglected areas of research. First, few works have systematically 
examined the relationship between demography and economic geography (see Costa and Kahn  46
(2000)). The long-run changes in population, fertility, mortality, life expectancy, family size and 
income are likely to have major impact on how Americans organize their spatial environment. 
Second, the role of political economy on the location of economic activities is not well 
understood. Recent work by Holmes (1998) suggests that state policies have an important impact 
on the location of industries. However, we know very little how the long-run changes in the 
political economy of the federal, state and local governments influenced the evolution of the 
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               Table 1 
 
    Per Capita Income by Region, 1840 and 1860 (in 1860 Prices) 
                                                                                                                                                     
          Total Population           Free Population 
 
    1840  1860  1880   1840  1860 
                                                                                                                                                     
National  Average    $96  $128 $173   $109 $144 
 
North     109  141  205   110  142 
  Northeast    129 181 244   130 183 
  North Central      65    89  170        66    90 
 
South          74  103    88    105  150 
  South Atlantic      66    84    78        96  124 
  East S. Central        69    89    88        92  124 
  West  S.  Central  151 184 104   238 274 
                                                                                                                                                    
Source: Fogel (1989) 
 
  





















      T a b l e   2  
 
        Number and Population of Cities in the United States, 1690-1990 
                                                                                                                                                                          
     N u m b e r   o f   C i t i e s  
 
      1690 1790 1820 1860 1880 1920 1940 1960 1960*  1990* 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
City Size 
2500-5000    3  12  26  163  467  1255 1422 1777 -  - 
5000-10000   1  7  22  136 249 715 965 1320  16434  16929 
10000-25000      3  8  58  146 465 665 1142  978 1290 
25000-50000      2  2  19  42  143 213 424 366 567 
50000-100000     2  7  15  76  107  203  180  309 
100000-250000        1  6  12 43 55 80 79 131 
250000-500000      1  4  13  23  29  30  40 
500000-1,000,000        2 3 9 9 16  16  15 
1,000,000  +       1  3  5  5  5  8 
 
Number    4  24  61  392  939  2722 3464 4996 18088  19289 
                                                                                                                                                                          
     Distribution  of  Population 
      ( P e r c e n t )  
 
      1690 1790 1820 1860 1880 1920 1940 1960 1960*  1990* 
                                                                                                                                                                          
City Size 
2500-5000    5.0% 1.1% 1.0% 1.9% 3.2% 4.1% 3.8% 3.5% -  - 
5000-10000    3.3 1.2 1.6 3.1 3.4 4.7 5.1 5.2 13.9  11.3 
10000-25000    0  1.2 1.3 2.8 4.4 6.7 7.6 9.9 8.4 8.2 
25000-50000    0  1.6 0.7 2.1 2.9 4.8 5.6 8.2 7.1 8.0 
50000-100000    0  0  1.3 1.4 1.9 5.0 5.6 7.8 7.0 8.5 
100000-250000    0  0  1.3 3.2 3.6 6.2 5.9 6.5 6.4 7.7 
250000-500000    0  0  0  0.8 2.6 4.3 5.9 5.9 6.0 5.7 
500000-1,000,000  0  0  0  4.4 3.8 5.9 4.9 6.2 6.2 4.1 
1,000,000  +    0 0 0 0 2.4  9.6  12.1  9.8  9.8  8.0 
Total  Urban    8.3%  5.1%  7.2%  19.8% 28.2% 51.2% 56.5% 63.1% 64.7% 61.6% 
 
(millions) 
Urban Population  0.02  0.2  0.7  6.2  14.1 54.2 74.4 112.5  116.0  153.1 
U.S.  Population    0.21  3.9  9.6  31.4  50.2  105.7 131.7 178.5 178.5 248.7 
                                                                                                                                                                          
* Uses the new urban areas defined by the 1960 Census of Population. 
Sources: Data for 1690 are from Bridenbaugh (1938) and the Historical Statistics of the United States. All  57
other data are from the Censuses of Population, 1960, Vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, U.S. 
Summary, 1-14-15 and the Statistical Abstract, 1992.  
 
 
      T a b l e   3  
 
      Number and Population of Metropolitan Areas in the United States, 1940-1990 
                                                                                                                                                                   
                Number of Cities 
 
    1940   1960   1990 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
Size Categories 
50,000-100,000         15      24      26  
100,000-250,000      69      91    143 
250,000-500,000      30      52      75 
500,000-1,000,000      13      31      45   
1,000,000 +        11      24      46   
 
Number   138   222   335 
                                                                                                                                                                   
     Distribution  of  Population 
      ( P e r c e n t )  
 
    1940   1960   1990 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
Size Categories 
50,000-100,000       1.0%      1.1%      0.9%  
100,000-250,000    16.9      8.2       9.1 
250,000-500,000      8.3      9.7    10.6 
500,000-1,000,000       6.9   12.0   13.1 
1,000,000  +    26.2   34.3   43.9 
 
Total  Metropolitan   51.0%   65.3%   77.5% 
 
(millions) 
Metropolitan Population    67.1    116.6    192.9 
U.S.  Population    131.7   178.5   248.7 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Sources: County Data Book, 1947; Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1965; Census of Population, 1990. 
Note: In general, the metropolitan area is a county or a group of contiguous counties (except in New 
England) which contains at least one central city of 50,000 inhabitants or more or “twin cities” with a 









           T a b l e   4  
 
        Population and Employment Densities of Cities, 1890-1990 
                                                                                                                                                                   
  Number  of  Average Average Average     
  Cities   Population  Area   Population   
    ( s q .   m i l e s )     D e n s i t y     
                                                                                                                                                                   
1890   122   113835   16.7   7648    
 
1900   160   123243   20.2   7377    
 
1910*   184   148442   23.1   7176    
 
1920*   252   145966   20.9   7597    
 
1930*   310   152890   21.9   7366    
 
1940   412   128051   19.2   6742    
 
1950   481   128811   19.5   6536    
 
1960   673   112400   22.8   5340    
 
1970   835   104785   28.5   4673    
 
1980   944   97756   32.8   3998    
 
1990   1068   98108   34.9   3783    
                                                                                                                                                                   
Note: The data, except for years 1910-1930, are for cities with population over 25,000. In 1890, two cities 
were omitted due to lack of data on land area. Cities in Alaska and Hawaii are excluded. 
*Data for 1910-1930 are for cities with population over 30,000. 
Sources: Social Statistics of Cities, 1890; Census of Population, 1900; Financial Statistics of Cities, 1910, 









         F i g u r e   1  
   U.S.  Population  Distribution,  1790-1990 




     F i g u r e   2  
             U.S. Regional Specialization, 1860-1990 
























































        Figure  3 
    Regional Income Per Capita, 1840-1990 



















Sources: Easterlin (1960, 1961), Statistical Abstract of the U.S, various years. 
 
 
    Figure  4 
    U.S. Urban Population by Size, 1690-1990 
    (Percent) 
 
























             Figure 5 
  U.S.  Metropolitan  Population by Size, 1940-1990 
             (Percent) 
 




     F i g u r e   6  
   Population  Density of Cities, 1890-1990 
    (Persons  per  square  mile) 
Sources: See Kim (2002) 
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